What the return of US hemispheric primacy means for Saint Lucia and CARICOM

Saint Lucia and CARICOM are coming under scrutiny by the Trump Administration in what may prove to be the most significant shift in US foreign policy toward the Caribbean in a generation. The White House proclamation imposing sanctions on Antigua and Barbuda and Dominica by restricting visa access is the clearest example of a new and more assertive posture towards our region. This should not come as a surprise given the signals from Washington since the start of the new Trump administration. 

On December 5, the Trump administration issued its 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS), a document that outlines Washington’s foreign policy principles and priorities. Traditionally released at the beginning of a new administration, the NSS outlines how the US intends to engage the world and its key strategic interests. 

The 2025 NSS should command the full attention of Saint Lucia and CARICOM.

For decades, America’s focus drifted away from the Caribbean toward the Middle East and Asia-Pacific. Since the end of the Cold War, engagement with our region had been deprioritised, resulting in limited high-level contact and modest strategic attention. From the 1990s until now, successive NSSs ranked Latin America and the Caribbean as of low to moderate strategic importance. Even during the first Trump Administration, the 2017 NSS placed the region last.

The 2025 NSS breaks decisively with that history. For the first time, Latin America and the Caribbean are ranked as a region of “Very High” strategic importance and, more crucially, as the top global priority. Asia, once first, now ranks second. Europe has slipped to third, followed by the Middle East, with Africa last.

This reshuffling is not symbolic. It signals a return to a hard-edged US focus on the western hemisphere.

Equally important is what the NSS de-prioritises. Multilateral institutions are explicitly downgraded, with the document reaffirming the primacy of the nation state. Washington has progressively disengaged from various multilateral organisations, notably the United Nations. This not only marks a clear departure from US internationalism but also has direct implications for engagement between Washington and CARICOM. 

The pattern is already visible. Trump’s first engagement with CARICOM leaders in 2019 did not occur through formal CARICOM structures, but through an irregular meeting at Mar-a-Lago with leaders aligned with Washington’s position on Venezuela. 

Despite reported requests from CARICOM Heads to the current administration for engagement with the White House, no formal Trump-CARICOM summit has followed. This is not a coincidence. For Trump, bilateralism is replacing plurilateral or multilateral approaches, weakening CARICOM’s ability to represent and advance the collective interest of the region.  

This trend has been confirmed in recent interactions with Washington. In March 2025, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio held bilateral talks with leaders from Jamaica, Guyana and Suriname during his Caribbean tour. In May, he hosted seven CARICOM Heads of Government in Washington for discussions on regional cooperation. Even then, engagement was limited and selective.

In trade and economic relations, the US has shifted away from non-reciprocal preferences under the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA), a 1983 US trade programme providing duty-free access for most goods originating in the region. Now, a differential and bilateral tariff regime applies with CARICOM states receiving individual ten per cent tariff treatment. 

US interest in the region is not new and has ebbed and flowed over the centuries according to identified security concerns. The first clear articulation of the need for hemispheric primacy came in 1823 when President James Monroe enunciated what became known as the Monroe Doctrine, effectively declaring the western hemisphere off-limits to European interference. That doctrine was expanded in 1904 through Theodore Roosevelt’s Corollary, asserting the US right to intervene across the region. Of course, interventions in Cuba, Haiti, Grenada and Nicaragua were implicitly justified under this unilateral doctrine.

The 2025 NSS represents a modern Trump Corollary.

It reasserts US primacy in the western hemisphere, particularly in response to China, Russia, Iran, and Cuba and Venezuela. The Caribbean is once again framed as a privileged sphere of US interest. The NSS is explicit in its intent to deny external strategic competitors the ability to deploy forces in the region or to own and control strategically vital assets. In other words, no other foreign power should hold a dominant position in the Latin American and Caribbean region. 

For Saint Lucia, the implications are sobering.

First, the growing leftward drift in parts of the OECS will attract heightened scrutiny from Washington. Notably, relationships with the Maduro regime in Venezuela will not escape attention. 

Secondly, it would not have escaped notice that the US is already taking steps to restrict visa access for citizens of our region for security concerns. In this context, the risks associated with Saint Lucia’s Citizenship by Investment Programme to US homeland security will continue to draw attention. Therefore, there is a real risk that our continued access to the US may be subject to review should we fall out of compliance with policy expectations. And this risk should not  be underestimated, especially in light of the US Proclamation issued on December 16 partially restricting the issuance of visas to citizens in Antigua and Barbuda and Dominica.  

Thirdly, our foreign policy choices, particularly as it relates to China and other strategic competitors of the US, will come under closer examination. The stated intent of Washington to exert influence over the region will likely come into conflict with the exercise of foreign policy decisions. 

The recent extraterritorial and extrajudicial practices, including actions against boats moving through international waters, are likely to continue without recourse. There is also a real possibility of an expanded ship-rider arrangement and maritime enforcement.

Finally, the economic dimension cannot be ignored. Saint Lucia and the region heavily rely on the US for their economic well-being. The risk of action, such as travel advisories and visa restrictions, could negatively impact tourist arrivals and limit financial and investment flows to the region.

The message is clear: the Caribbean is back at the centre of US strategic thinking but on Washington’s terms. For Saint Lucia and CARICOM, the challenge is not whether this shift will affect us, but whether we are ready to respond with clarity, unity and strategic purpose.

Amb. Stephen Fevrier is a former OECS Ambassador to the United Nations in Geneva and a former Senior Advisor to the Director-General of the World Trade Organisation. He holds a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science, a Bachelor of Laws, and a Master’s degree in International Commercial Law.

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